phone scams

The phone rings. IT support says there’s a security incident on your account. They need your password to reset it and protect your data. The caller sounds professional, maybe a little stressed. Your caller ID shows your company’s actual number.

You give them your password.

I’ve seen this happen to smart, security-aware people. They knew better. In the moment, it didn’t matter. That’s what makes vishing so effective.

Vishing works differently than email phishing. With email, you have time to think, to hover over links, to forward suspicious messages to IT. A phone call strips all of that away.

You can’t pause a conversation. The social pressure to respond immediately is overwhelming. Silence feels awkward. Asking to call back feels rude.

Hanging up feels wrong. We’re conditioned to be polite. Ending a call abruptly triggers social anxiety, even when we’re suspicious.

Voice creates trust. A confident, professional tone establishes credibility in ways text never can. We’re wired to trust voices.

Caller ID lies. That number showing your bank’s real phone number? Spoofed in about 30 seconds with free software. The technology to fake caller ID is trivially available.

“Hi, this is Mike from IT support. We’re seeing some suspicious activity on your account. I need to verify your identity and reset your credentials.”

Attackers use:

• Internal jargon and procedures they’ve researched
• Urgency around “security incidents”
• Request for credentials to “help” you

“This is Chase Bank calling about suspicious activity on your account. To verify your identity, please provide your account number and the last four digits of your Social Security number.”

Attackers create fear of financial loss to override caution.

“This is the IRS. You have unpaid taxes and a warrant will be issued for your arrest unless you pay immediately.”

Uses fear of government authority and legal consequences.

“This is Microsoft Support. We’ve detected a virus on your computer. Let me walk you through the steps to remove it.”

Leads to remote access installation and credential theft.

“Hi, this is Sarah from the CEO’s office. He needs a wire transfer processed urgently for an acquisition. Can you handle this quietly?”

Combines authority pressure with confidentiality to prevent verification.

Unsolicited contact: You didn’t initiate the call, but they claim to have information about you.

Urgency: “Immediate” action required or consequences will follow.

Request for sensitive info: Passwords, account numbers, Social Security numbers, verification codes.

Caller ID mismatch: Even if it shows a legitimate number, caller ID is easily spoofed.

Resistance to verification: Pushback when you suggest calling back through official channels.

Information they shouldn’t have: Partial account details used to establish false credibility.

Vishing exploits several psychological principles:

When someone claims to represent authority (IT, bank, government), we’re conditioned to comply. Attackers leverage this by impersonating authority figures or organizations.

The caller appears to be helping you by alerting you to a problem. This creates pressure to reciprocate by complying with their requests.

Threats about account compromise, legal action, or financial loss activate fear responses that bypass rational evaluation.

“This needs to happen now” prevents careful consideration and verification.

Small initial requests (confirming your name) lead to larger ones (providing your password). Once you’ve started cooperating, stopping feels inconsistent.

Verify independently: Never trust caller-provided callback numbers. Look up official contact information separately.

Take your time: Legitimate organizations don’t require instant decisions. “I’ll call you back” is always appropriate.

Never share credentials: No legitimate organization asks for passwords over the phone. Ever.

Be suspicious of spoofed numbers: Caller ID is not authentication.

When in doubt, hang up: Ending a suspicious call is always the right choice.

Clear policies: Document what information can and cannot be shared over the phone.

Callback procedures: Require verification through known numbers, not numbers provided by callers.

Reporting mechanisms: Make it easy to report suspicious calls to security teams.

Employee training: Include vishing scenarios in security awareness programs.

Caller verification processes: Establish methods for verifying internal callers (callback, known extensions, code words).

Recorded examples: Let employees hear what vishing calls actually sound like.

Practice scenarios: Simulated vishing calls that test response without real consequences.

Verification drills: Practice looking up and using official callback procedures.

Psychological awareness: Understanding why these attacks work helps resist them.

• Normalize questioning callers
• Celebrate employees who verify before acting
• Remove stigma from hanging up on suspicious calls
• Ensure managers model verification behavior

1. Document the call (time, claims made, requested info)
2. Report to IT security
3. Share with colleagues who may receive similar calls

1. Change passwords immediately
2. Enable 2FA if not already active
3. Report to IT security
4. Monitor affected accounts for unauthorized activity

1. Contact your bank immediately
2. Place fraud alerts on credit reports
3. Document everything for potential law enforcement
4. Monitor all accounts for unauthorized transactions

• Analyze attack patterns for organizational targeting
• Identify information attackers had (may indicate prior compromise)
• Determine attack vector (targeted or broad campaign)

• Alert employees about current vishing campaigns
• Provide specific details about attack pretexts
• Reinforce verification procedures

• Update security awareness training with new patterns
• Consider simulated vishing exercises
• Review and strengthen verification procedures

Attackers called Twitter employees claiming to be IT support. Using information gathered from previous research, they convinced employees to provide VPN credentials.

Result: Compromise of high-profile accounts including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Elon Musk, and Apple, which were used to promote a cryptocurrency scam.

What failed: Employees provided credentials over the phone despite this being against policy.

What would have helped: Established callback verification procedures, stronger culture of challenging callers, training on this specific scenario.

Advances in AI voice synthesis make vishing increasingly dangerous:

• Voice cloning: AI can replicate specific voices from samples
• Real-time adaptation: Systems can respond naturally to questions
• Accent and language: AI eliminates language barriers for global attacks

This means traditional detection methods (accent, awkward phrasing) become less reliable. Verification procedures become even more critical.

Here’s the thing about vishing defense: you can’t rely on detecting the attack. Good vishers sound completely legitimate. The tells you’d look for in email don’t exist in a well-executed phone call.

So stop trying to detect. Instead, verify everything.

“Let me call you back through our main number.” Say it every time someone asks for sensitive information over the phone. IT support, your bank, your CEO’s assistant. Everyone.

Yes, it feels awkward. Yes, legitimate callers might be annoyed. But that momentary awkwardness is nothing compared to explaining how you gave your password to an attacker who sounded exactly like your IT department.

The Twitter hack in 2020? Started with vishing calls to employees. The attackers were good enough to fool people who should have known better. The employees who stopped it weren’t the ones who detected something wrong. They were the ones who verified anyway.

Train your team to verify before they share. Try our interactive security exercises with realistic vishing scenarios.