Insufficient CI/CD Flow Control Mechanisms

Insufficient CI/CD Flow Control Mechanisms

Branch protection means nothing if a deploy skips the pipeline.

What Is Insufficient CI/CD Flow Control Mechanisms?

The gates that review and scan a change live inside the pipeline, so any path to production that skips the pipeline skips every gate. You'll watch an attacker with ordinary developer access deploy a locally built artifact straight to the deploy endpoint with the release job's credential, then close the hole by binding deploys to a pipeline-issued provenance token and alerting on any deploy with no run behind it.

What You'll Learn in Insufficient CI/CD Flow Control Mechanisms

Insufficient CI/CD Flow Control Mechanisms — Training Steps

  1. The one path that is guarded

    Veldrin ships through a pipeline. Every change to the order-service repo goes through a Release run that reviews it, scans it, and only then deploys. Branch protection on main blocks anything unreviewed. Bob has an ordinary developer's access, taken from a compromised laptop. He has no way past review. So he looks at how production is actually updated.

  2. The deploy token nobody owns

    The Release pipeline is the only thing allowed to touch main, and it reviews and scans every change. But the step that actually reaches production is a call to a deploy endpoint, and that call authenticates with a static token the release job reads from the repo's shared variables.

  3. Build it on his own machine

    Bob does not open a pull request. He builds the order-service image on his own laptop, with whatever changes he likes, because nothing between here and production will read it.

  4. Push it straight to production

    With the release token, Bob calls the deploy endpoint himself and points it at the image he just built. There is no run, no review, and no scan in the path. The endpoint only checks that the caller holds the token.

  5. The repo looks untouched

    Bob reloads the pipeline. Production now runs his version, and the register shows it arrived with no run behind it. The main branch and its history are exactly as they were, which is the point: nothing in the repository records what happened.

  6. Production with no run behind it

    The production banner names the version that is live and the run that produced it. For the version Bob pushed, there is no run to name.

  7. Why the gate missed it

  8. A version with no run

    Veldrin's release monitor compares what is live against the runs that produced it. This morning it cannot match the production version to any run.

  9. Open the deploy record

    The pipeline keeps a deploy record: every deploy to production and the run that produced it. Alice opens it to see the one the monitor could not reconcile.

  10. One deploy with no run

    Every normal deploy in the record names the run that produced it. One does not. It names the release token and a developer address, with no run and no review behind it.

Security Framework Coverage

OWASP CI/CD Top 10

  • CICD-SEC-1 Insufficient Flow Control Mechanisms

CWE

  • CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure
  • CWE-285 Improper Authorization

MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1078 Valid Accounts

CIS Controls

  • CIS 16 Application Software Security

NIST CSF

  • PR.AT-02 Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind
  • PR.PS Platform Security

NICE Framework

  • DD-WRL-004 Secure Systems Development
  • IO-WRL-005 Systems Administration