Overly Permissive Kubernetes Authorization
One temporary cluster-admin binding, and a contractor reads payroll.
What Is Overly Permissive Kubernetes Authorization?
Kubernetes RBAC only ever adds permissions, so a temporary binding to cluster-admin stays a cluster-wide grant until someone deletes it. You'll use a phished contractor's credential, discover it can do anything in any namespace, and read pay records from another team's database pod. Then you'll replace the binding with a namespaced Role, delete the wide grant and prove with kubectl auth can-i that the group is refused. Maps to OWASP Kubernetes Top Ten K02, Overly Permissive Authorization.
What You'll Learn in Overly Permissive Kubernetes Authorization
- Distinguish a namespaced RoleBinding from a cluster-wide ClusterRoleBinding.
- Read kubectl auth can-i --list output and recognize wildcard access.
- Explain why RBAC changes must remove old grants, since permissions only add.
- Verify a group's effective access by impersonating it with kubectl auth can-i.
Overly Permissive Kubernetes Authorization — Training Steps
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Whose credential is this
Bob bought a kubeconfig phished from a Tessivane reporting contractor. Before doing anything with it, he asks the cluster who it thinks he is. Tessivane runs payroll for mid-sized employers. Its clusters hold every employee's salary and bank details.
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What may this contractor do
Bob asks for the full list of what the credential is allowed.
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Find the payroll database
With cluster-admin, the namespace boundary means nothing. Bob looks for where the payroll data lives.
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Read the pay records
Bob runs a query inside the payroll database pod. The database trusts connections from inside its own pod.
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Check your understanding
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A contractor in the payroll database
Tessivane's security team finds a contractor identity running exec into the payroll database pod.
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Find the binding
Alice opens the RBAC manifests for the reports team.
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A temporary fix that stayed
The binding grants the whole contractor group the built-in cluster-admin role, cluster-wide. The comment says why.
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The Role that was already there
The reports team had a scoped Role all along. It allows read-only access to pods, logs, services and deployments, in the reports namespace only.
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Bind the group to the scoped Role
Alice replaces the cluster-wide admin binding with a RoleBinding in the reports namespace that points at reports-viewer.
Security Framework Coverage
OWASP Kubernetes Top 10
- K02:2025 Overly Permissive Authorization
CWE
- CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
- CWE-266 Incorrect Privilege Assignment
MITRE ATT&CK
- T1609 Container Administration Command
- T1078 Valid Accounts
CIS Controls
- CIS 6 Access Control Management
- CIS 4 Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software
NIST CSF
- PR.AT-02 Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind
- PR.AA Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control
- PR.PS Platform Security
NICE Framework
- IO-WRL-005 Systems Administration
- DD-WRL-001 Cybersecurity Architecture